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A crisis of confidence regarding Psychiatry exists even among psychiatrists 
themselves. Psychiatry has a checkered history and its alliance with the 
pharmaceutical industry, aka Big-Pharma, continues to reinforce a need for 
healthy skepticism. Fundamentally there is an over-reliance on the 
questionable expertise and authority afforded psychiatrists as the specialists 
of mental health. I contend that the authority of psychiatry is misplaced and 
too often, harmful. Since the criteria required to justify and satisfy psychiatric 
expertise is not fully established as can be substantiated by compelling 
reasons to rethink its authority as a reliable profession in its current form. 
Psychiatric expertise is not particularly scientific and this is especially 
dangerous in a sector that prescribes psychoactive drugs. There are a number 
of identified criteria that would otherwise substantiate psychiatric expertise 
and whilst partially existent, are nonetheless deficient. These major yet 
deficient aspects of psychiatric practice concern diagnostic problems – 
reliability and verification of diagnoses and accurate testable validity of 
diagnoses - mainly due to an absence of identifiable underlying biomarkers 
ordinarily related to disease or biological conditions. Psychiatrists often fail 
to distinguish between reactive-depression (reaction to external event or 
circumstance) and endogenous-depression (biological) resulting, in part, from 
incorrectly distinguishing between conditions constitutive of ‘trait’ 
(endogenous) and of those of ‘state’ (e.g. reactive depression; adverse effects 
from medication, etc.).  
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A crisis of confidence regarding Psychiatry exists even among psychiatrists 
themselves. Psychiatry has a checkered history and its alliance with the 
pharmaceutical industry, aka Big-Pharma, reinforces a need for healthy skepticism. 
Why? An over-reliance on the questionable expertise and authority afforded 
psychiatry as the specialists of mental health. Psychiatrists, in many ways, not only 
determine what mental illness is but also what and how treatment is administered 
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to those deemed afflicted. The presumption that this authority is based on expertise 
can have a profound effect on people and so requires detailed attention. 
Psychiatrists can enforce the Mental Health Act across jurisdictions and compel 
hospital admissions, and if so determined, seclusion and restraint within hospital; 
an authority which extends to private care-residency facilities, and far too often, 
and way beyond responsible clinical requirement, the excessive administration of 
psychoactive drugs. Psychiatrists, generally, are sought after to offer opinions 
concerning people‟s capacities to rationally make financial and medical decisions, 
moreover to provide opinions regarding whether someone requires hospitalisation 
or prison (Badre, Barnes, Lehman & Steingard, 2019, pp. 155-156). On close 
examination however psychiatric expertise is imprecise, broadly at variance 
among its own rank and file, too often unreliable, marred by methodological 
diagnostic deficiencies (Phillips, 2015 p. 164); thus arguably, justified concern 
symptomatic of its own reliance on a less than robust methodological framework. 
Despite extensive research the most significant finding is a “failure to delineate the 
pathophysiology of the major psychiatric disorders, and the corresponding failure 
to find biomarkers for these disorders” (Phillips, 2015 p.164). So, why is psychiatry 
regarded as a specialist profession that wields medical authority, which has 
become increasingly relied upon for its presumed expertise in both mental health 
and disability service sectors and across their governing institutions? Over the last 
twenty-five years there has been a proliferation of work that continues to emerge 
that questions the underpinning assumptions of psychiatric knowledge and 
practice. “This work, appearing as academic papers, magazine articles, books, and 
chapters in books, has not been written by academics, sociologists or cultural 
theorists. It has emerged from the pens and practice of a group of British 
psychiatrists” (Thomas, 2013). In fact, the movement has increasingly grown to 
incorporate psychiatrists and associated clinicians and researchers in America, 
Australia, New Zealand, and throughout Europe. 
People with lived-experience tell a different story to that found in the 
literature funded by the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, the literature on 
research studies investigating the long-term effects of psychiatric drugs, identifying 
the range and scale of adverse effects (iatrogenic damage) from antipsychotics 
(neuroleptics) and antidepressants, provide cautionary and often contrary accounts 
to that found in psychiatric journals (Dorozenko and Martin, 2017).  
A qualification is required here to acknowledge that many people benefit from 
psychiatric services and from the administration of psychiatric drugs particularly 
when the condition being treated is in fact endogenous. Though one should not 
doubt that for many individuals there is an interplay of environmental and 
psychological factors that trigger dysfunction amplified by the combination of 
stressors, or even, if at times, these may occur in isolation (Preston & Johnson, 
2019). Real benefit is gained by individuals, more so, when treated on a short-term 
basis, in most instances, without the need for drugs. Longitudinal studies show that 
long-term use of antipsychotics and antidepressants produce more damage than 
benefit for the consumer both financially and at the expense of genuine good 
health (Breggin, 2013; Davies, 2013; Gøtzsche 2013; Moncrieff, 2008; Szasz, 
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2010; Whitaker, 2015). Controversy surrounds the inherent problems associated 
with the professional and clinical education psychiatrists are receiving. Mental 
health should be considered along a continuum such that practitioners need to be 
qualifying to what extent a disorder comes about by psychological factors or 
whether there really is empirical evidence that supports the notion of biochemical 
disturbance at play (Preston & Johnson, 2019).  
Accordingly, this essay focuses on the profession of both biological 
psychiatry and psychological psychiatry, relative to the constitutive development 
of expertise, as understood as the subject of psychological investigation, examined 
through a comparative analysis with medicine in general. The methodology 
employed is a critical examination of the historical literature of psychiatry, of 
expertise, of relevant medical advances, and of contemporary studies into the 
practice of psychiatry. The process unfolds through an examination of the criteria 
required to establish subject or profession related expertise to then consider the 
reliance on psychiatric expertise and the identifiable implications of such reliance 
as it plays out in society and interrelated institutions and services. The ethical 
perspective underpinning the research for this essay is the Common Theory of 
Morality as articulated by Beauchamp and Childress (2009). From this there are 
four main principles that operate in health care: principle of respect for autonomy; 
principle of non-maleficence; principle of beneficence, and; the principle of 
justice. Psychiatric coercion breaches both the principle of respect for autonomy 
and the principle of non-maleficence, and the justification for doing so is often 
shrouded in questionable subjective psychiatric jargon and implied authority. An 
analysis of the subjective feature of psychiatry is required for its part to 
substantiate the claim that the authority of psychiatry is misplaced and too often 
harmful. As such, the following section examines human agency to establish 
whether medical authority and expertise legitimately emerges within the practice 
of psychiatry.  
 
 
Human Agency and Authority: The Curse of Expertise 
 
The term „expert‟ implies the notion of authority, which contains two main 
senses: „expertise‟, and „the right to rule‟. To have authority pertaining to belief (to 
be „an authority‟) is to have:  
 
...theoretical authority; to have authority over action (to be „in authority‟) is to have 
practical authority. Both senses involve the subordination of an individual‟s judgment 
or will to that of another person in a way that is binding, independent of the particular 
content of what that person says or requires. If a person‟s authority is recognized then 
it is effective or de facto authority; if it is justified then it is de jure authority. The 
latter is the primary notion, for de jure authority is what de facto authorities claim and 
what they are believed to have. Authority thus differs from effective power, but also 
from justified power, which may involve no subordination of judgment. In many 
cases, however, practical authority is justified only if it is also effective (Green 1998).  
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In virtue of these two senses and in particular, that practical authority is 
justified only when effective, the leading question asks: is the authority of 
psychiatry justified? Expert authority is not just relational to its specific field or 
practice because in many instances it is mutually inclusive of the exercise of 
power or influence across several fields such as the authority of expert witness in 
Courts of Law, Mental Health Tribunals, State Administration Tribunals, for 
example. The most common problem with the expert-witness, is reliability. By 
what standards should the term expert be assigned in this context when reliability 
within psychiatry, is not sustainably established? Disorder as classified in 
psychiatry is officially biomedical. “Psychiatric disorders and diagnoses are 
expected to follow the model of … medicine with psychiatric disorders and 
diagnoses rooted in biomedical pathology” (Phillips, 2015, p. 179). Yet 
disturbingly, the extent of the model‟s limitations gives rise to persistent reliability 
concerns within psychiatry. Reliability is an operational requirement in medicine. 
Success, in any practice, is often a good measure or criteria as a guide to what 
constitutes expertise. Over the course of its own life psychiatric success has been 
far from impressive, for its marred history as measured by patient-maintenance. 
Psychiatry faces a doubled-edged sword when trying to coherently establish 
patient-maintenance success that results from nothing more than a placebo effect 
against success resulting from good clinical management.  
Accordingly, in terms of human agency what role does individual-psychology 
play? Experiments based on decision-making and performance on attention-
related tasks, show that the participants can also be influenced by priming and by 
other external factors as demonstrated by experimenters at Northwestern University 
(2012). Authors Hajo Adam and Adam Galinsky coined the term “enclothed 
cognition” to describe the co-occurrence of two factors – “the symbolic meaning 
of clothes and the physical experience of wearing them” (2012, p. 1). The research 
explored the effects of wearing a lab-coat in one experiment (E1) and in 
subsequent testing, the coat was referred to as either a doctor‟s coat (E2), or a 
painter‟s coat (E3). The focus of the experiment was on „attentiveness and 
carefulness‟ of the participating subjects. In the experiment, when participants 
wore the coat called the „doctor‟s coat‟ (E2) the result achieved was an increased 
sustained attention compared to (E1); and even more so, when compared to 
participants who wore the lab-coat called a painter‟s coat (E3) (2012, p. 1). One‟s 
belief and attitude towards any task can significantly affect performance and 
outcome because overall, one‟s belief, informs behaviour. By analogy, whatever 
assumed success psychiatry has enjoyed, of that, what percentage is due to placebo 
effects as rendered from perceived clinical authority? As psychiatrist Allen Frances 
Chair of DSM-IV Task Force describes: 
 
Placebo pain pills dampen the brain‟s response to painful stimuli; placebo 
antidepressants mimic the brain‟s effect of real antidepressants; placebo Parkinson‟s 
pills stimulate the brain‟s dopamine system; … placebo caffeine and Ritalin have a 
stimulating impact on brain centres; and placebo profoundly affect the immune 
system. … The social factor is also important – being a placebo responder helps 
maintain key relationships and supports precious communal rituals. ... The medicine 
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man and his patients have always shared the need to believe in the healing power of 
the currently fashionable theories, rituals, chants, incantations, diagnostic and testing 
procedures, and medicines (Frances, 2013 pp. 98-99). 
 
In other words, the physiological benefit achieved from placebo, though 
psychosomatic, is quite significant and additional to any psychological benefit. In 
the following section, research on diagnostic medicine is presented to establish the 
foundations and development of expertise in medicine in order to provide a 
comparative analysis with psychiatry as a medical practice. 
 
 
Diagnostic Medicine 
 
Authors, Geoff Norman, Kevin Eva, Lee Brooks, and Stan Hamstra of 
Expertise in Medicine and Surgery (2006) published in The Cambridge Handbook 
of Expertise and Expert Performance, provide what is still current understanding 
of the development of expertise: 
 
Expertise in medicine requires mastery of a diversity of knowledge and skills – 
motor, cognitive, and interpersonal … Although some specialties such as pathology 
or surgery may emphasize one kind of skill or another, most clinicians must be skilled 
in all domains and must also master an enormous knowledge base drawn from areas 
as diverse as molecular biology, ethics, and psychology (Norman et.al. 2006, p. 339).           
 
As a domain of expertise, medicine is unique not only because of the required 
formal knowledge base, which is extensive, but medicine is also dynamic. 
Advances in our biological understanding, inclusive of the social and 
environmental influences, aided by advances in our technologies, render 
approaches to therapy subject to constant change. With the advent of new drugs 
and commercial influences, keeping abreast of this continually changing 
landscape, is a significant hurdle for practitioners. Consider what this means in 
terms of diagnosis: 
 
The interplay between the formal knowledge of medicine and experiential knowledge 
has emerged as a central issue in understanding medical expertise. … Indeed, much 
of what we call medical expertise is really closer to medical diagnostic expertise, and, 
of this, much is confined to the diagnosis of problems in internal medicine (Norman 
et al. 2006, p. 340). 
 
Pointedly, we glean the understanding that medical expertise is closer to 
medical diagnostic expertise. Norman, et al., (2006) identify three distinguishable 
yet broad approaches to understanding medical diagnostic expertise as prevalent 
throughout its history. Earlier understanding predicated on process-oriented studies 
held that diagnosis was a general skill acquired by practitioners contemporaneously 
with medical knowledge, “but distinct from knowledge (2006, p. 340). They report 
a paradigm shift occurred in the 1980‟s and that the old process-oriented model 
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was replaced by a new model recognising the central role of knowledge, relative to 
its extent and organisation. In sum, incorporating a time line to which further 
investigation found that medical expertise involves coordination among several 
kinds of knowledge. Thus, three broad types of knowledge were identified and 
investigated: causal knowledge (understanding basic mechanisms and interactions), 
analytical knowledge (formal relation between diagnoses and features – signs/ 
symptoms/conditions), and experiential knowledge (accumulation or experiential-
repository of prior cases based on previous experience) (2006, p. 340).  
Psychiatry, is largely practice-based and primarily trades on symptom-based 
diagnosis even though variability among humans is vast, despite the similarity of 
symptoms co-occurring across disparate and broad range of disorders. So, not 
without contention, psychiatry‟s symptom-based experiential method of diagnosis 
somehow provides the legitimacy it enjoys for its role as a practice. To examine 
experiential knowledge in this context requires understanding the role of 
exemplars so pivotal within the domains of mental health and disability healthcare. 
Experiential knowledge, utilized for diagnostic purposes, is commensurate to 
recognising suitable exemplars. Psychological examination of the role of prior 
examples in everyday concept formation is what led to “exemplar theory”. In 
brief, every learned category contains a number of examples acquired through 
experience. The examples acquired through experience that are to a high extent 
dependent on experience, are said to be individually retrievable. The sum of these 
examples provide support for the categorisation of any new cases, based on “some 
kind of similarity to at least one prior example” (Norman, et al. 2006, p. 340). 
Exemplar theory shares similarities to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) 
which is a form of inductive reasoning employed in abductive arguments derived 
from C.S. Peirce. Abductive arguments lead to an explanatory hypothesis, as often 
used in medicine. A typical medical example runs like this: a) patient presents with 
slight fever and red spots over body; b) an explanation would be patient has 
measles (hypothesis); c) patient having measles is the best explanation for why 
there occurs slight fever and red spots over the body; therefore, probably, this 
patient has measles (Govier, 2010, p. 298). Because measles is a testable disease, 
makes this line of reasoning quite typical of symptom-based diagnosis. Yet these 
same symptoms, „slight fever and red spots‟ can be confused with other illnesses. 
Additional complexity obtains with psychiatric disorders, insofar as they are not 
situated within the same ontological category largely due to an absence of 
identifiable biomarkers as expected with biological psychiatric disorders that 
would also provide testable verification of such psychiatric disorders. Whereas in 
medicine, biomarker studies have increasingly become integral to clinical 
pharmacologic research for use in producing targeted therapies. Psychiatry, on the 
other hand, draws blanks on so many psychiatric disorders. For variability between 
individuals as with variability between presentations of symptoms, loom large. 
Therefore, where there is great and broad variation among examples and between 
individuals, the weaker the capacity to diagnose efficiently and reliably (Norman, 
et al. 2006, p. 341). Other concerns add complexity to establishing reliable and 
verifiable psychiatric diagnoses. 
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To examine these, attention turns to assess other measures employed to 
evaluate and track development to understand the structure of expertise. According 
to Phillip Ackerman and Margaret Beier, authors of Methods for Studying the 
Structure of Expertise: Psychometric Approaches (2006), we understand 
psychometrics, as the scientific discipline formed by the combination of 
psychological inquiry and quantitative measurement. Considering psychometric 
approaches to expertise the most general revolve around „measurement and 
prediction‟ of individual differences and group differences (e.g. age, gender) and 
more specifically, to the „level of proficiency‟ and „expert performance‟ (Ackerman 
& Beier, 2006, p. 147). These refer more to the acquisition of skills and to the 
measurement of the individual‟s development. However, psychometric 
considerations provide a further approach to the identification of symptoms and 
equally probable causes of error most linked to „causal knowledge‟ and „analytical 
knowledge‟ as described above in the Norman et al (2006) research.  
To appreciate the pitfalls associated with causal knowledge and analytical 
knowledge requires apprehending probable factors that when wrongly classified 
by a practitioner substantially increases the margin of diagnostic error. One such 
factor of patient diagnostic relevance is that between „trait‟ and „state‟. „Traits‟ are 
stable dispositions characterized in two ways: either as „physical properties‟, like 
visual acuity, strength, agility, and so on, or as „psychological properties‟, like 
rationality, and intelligence. „States‟, conversely, are characterised as short-lasting 
qualities distinguishable by changeable moods, so by definition are broad. For 
example, being excited or happy, then “sad, or angry, sleepy and the like” 
(Ackerman & Beier, 2006. P. 147). A state therefore includes anything that induces 
a mood change, such as, a disruption caused by the ingestion of some causal agent, 
alcohol for example, more explicitly, psychiatric drugs. Hence, mistaking state for 
trait is a problem associated with both causal knowledge and poor analytical 
knowledge, as defined by Norman, et al. (2006). The implications are dire. An 
example of a medication-induced state causing delirium, or psychosis and violent 
behaviour, is medication-induced akathisia (Greek meaning: „can‟t sit down‟). 
“Akathisia is a dangerous adverse effect of antidepressants, antipsychotics and 
some other drugs that cross the blood-brain barrier” (Eikelenboom-Schieveld, 
Lucire and Fogleman, 2016, p. 65). Prescribed medicines can increase blood levels 
“towards toxicity because of genetically determined metabolizing capacities, high 
doses and interactions with co-prescribed CYP450 inhibitors and synergies” that 
often-times produce erratic and disruptive behaviour. Pharmacogenetics includes 
the “genetics of the cytochrome P450 (CYP450) system which are the otherwise 
invisible factor that can correlate with catastrophic behavioural disturbances” 
(Eikelenboom-Schieveld, Lucire and Fogleman, 2016, p. 65; Breggin, 2013, pp. 
40-41). Severe akathisia-related effects causing violence and suicidality will “abate 
when medication is decreased, changed or slowly stopped. Suicidality and 
violence tend to get worse if the dose is not tapered slowly” (Eikelenboom-
Schieveld, Lucire and Fogleman, 2016, p. 65; Lucire, & Crotty, 2011; Breggin, 
2013, p. 41).  
The evidence is both genetically and behaviourally clear (Moncrieff 2008; 
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Bentall 2010) yet many psychiatrists deny psychotropic drugs produce adverse 
effects. Much worse, too many psychiatrists are even convinced that “it is not an 
adverse effect of the drug but a positive sign that the drug starts working” 
(Bielefeldt, Danborg, and Gøtzsche, 2016, p. 385). Cognitive scientists refer to this 
style of thinking as „strategic ignorance‟: “deliberately avoiding or adapting new 
knowledge or techniques, strategies, in order to avoid discomfort and to increase 
our productivity” (Robson, 2019, p. 267). If this is the case, then it is a functional 
approach and trades on „motivated reasoning‟ which incorporates several forms of 
bias whereby exposure to counterarguments tend to backfire, such that people not 
only reject the counterargument but that their views, as a result, become more 
engrained (Robson, 2019). What makes this picture worse is that this same attitude 
pervades general practitioners (GP‟s) who prescribe psychiatric medication but 
due to the lack of appropriate education about the adverse effects of psychotropic 
drugs, only adds to the crisis. Among psychiatrists and GP‟s, there is an evident 
lack in both ethical and clinical recognition that “the CYP450 enzymes can be 
induced or inhibited by many drugs and substances resulting in drug interactions in 
which one drug enhances the toxicity or reduces the therapeutic effect of another 
drug” (Le, 2016, p. 1). The liver‟s capacity for metabolism through the CYP450 
enzyme system with age “is reduced by ≥ 30% because hepatic volume and blood 
flow are decreased” (Le, 2016, p. 1).  
Consequently, over time maintaining or stabilizing a patient with treatment 
that is supposedly recovery oriented is virtually impossible, particularly when the 
psychiatrist‟s reliance is to an ill-guided option that very often turns out to be an 
unsuitable patient-drug treatment. It follows that due to the misplaced authority 
afforded psychiatry such to subjugate the autonomy of a patient stands even more 
pertinent in the overall scheme of medical treatment, not just because they are 
authorized to prescribe psychoactive drugs, but because it is tantamount to 
violating a person‟s autonomy and human rights when the treatment is coerced, 
enforced, and too often harmful. Remembering, psychiatrists can enforce the 
Mental Health Act, GP‟s cannot!  
Psychometric approaches to the inquiry of expertise formalize other predictors 
and one that has some merit in other disciplines regarding reliability, which is 
relevant to this study of psychiatric expertise, is „inter-observer reliability‟. Broadly, 
this refers to an „index of agreement‟ between different individuals who act as 
judges. An application of this method occurs when an individual performance 
cannot be objectively evaluated (e.g. music composition, gymnastic tournament, 
artwork submission, etc.). When agreement between judges in rank-ordering of 
individuals is high that corresponds to high inter-observer reliability; where there 
is “little agreement, reliability of the judgements is low” (Ackerman & Beier, 
2006, p. 148). The problem, however, encountered in mental health and disability 
sectors is reliability and verification of diagnosis (Zachar & Jablensky, 2015). This 
kind of modelling when used in case conferences, for example, between groups of 
psychiatrists, even if inadvertently, often incorporates biases perpetuating 
misunderstood patient symptoms and the consequent errant diagnoses. Hence, a 
significant indication of internal problems for psychiatry as a profession relates to 
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misdiagnoses involving mistaking „state‟ for „trait‟. By misdiagnosing symptoms, 
for example, mistaking tardive dyskinesia for catatonia (Zachar & Jablensky, 
2015, p. 8); or akathisia for hyperactivity; or exuberance for attention deficit 
disorder; or unhappiness and boredom for depression; trauma for a whole range of 
so-called psychiatric disorders, etc.; these errors, will ultimately lead to 
mismanagement and inappropriate treatment options (Whitaker, 2015, p. 212; 
Kolk, 2014, pp. 37-38). This is a common occurrence and not an exception to the 
rule of psychiatric practice. The current dominant psychiatric drug-based paradigm 
of treatment progresses through a trial and error prescriptive process of readily 
changing medication in exploratory practice to find a suitable assumed medication- 
to-client fit, too often at great cost and adverse harm to child/patient/client 
(Steingard, 2019, p.116). Rather disturbingly, even though verifiable and reliable 
scientific methods are available through pharmacogenetics, as mentioned above. 
Furthermore, misdiagnoses involving psychiatrists mistaking „state‟ for „trait‟ 
generates additional repercussions that impact patient welfare rather significantly, 
that of which involves the under-reporting of adverse events. It is estimated that 
only about five-percent of adverse events are reported by practitioners, nationally. 
The Minister for Health the Hon. Greg Hunt in a letter dated 20 August 2018 to the 
Chair, Standing Committee on Petitions, acknowledged that under-reporting of 
adverse events is a global issue (author sighted letter). Likewise, Robertson and 
Newby (2013) in Low Awareness of Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems: a 
consumer survey, identify a massive gap in psychiatric drug related adverse effects 
being reported. Most often consumers report adverse-effects to their prescribing 
psychiatrist yet all too often the adverse effects are rationalized away by the 
psychiatrist. More broadly, relying on the prescribing practitioners to report such 
adverse events is evidently a very poor and unreliable pathway to register such 
adverse drug-events. Indeed, interrogating why there are such low numbers of 
reported adverse events, can arguably be understood as a conceptual and 
attitudinal issue about how psychiatrists, in particular, play down adverse effects 
and quite commonly define them as comorbidities (Breggin, 2013; Davies, 2013; 
Hari, 2018; Kolk, 2014; Steingard, 2019; Whitaker, 2015). Unfortunately, many 
patients are subsequently prescribed additional medication by their psychiatrists 
(problem of polypharmacy), to treat the adverse-effect or insist the patient requires 
Electro-Convulsive-Therapy (ECT) (Moore, 2018) when otherwise, as is not 
uncommon, the psychiatrist characterizes the patient as „medication resistant‟ 
(Breggin 2013; Davies 2013; Gøtzsche 2013; Moncrieff, 2008; Steingard, 2019). 
The chief error in psychiatry is overstatement and though its aim is plausible 
its success exaggerated. This, in effect on a grand scale, is to commit the „fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness‟ as coined by Alfred North Whitehead (1978, p.7):  
 
This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstractness involved when an actual 
entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. 
There are aspects of actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict 
thought to these categories.    
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Mistaking adverse effects for comorbidities, misdiagnosing trauma for mental 
disorders to say the least about the practice of psychiatry is to recognise the fatal 
error so often committed by psychiatrists, is the „fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness‟.  
To further establish the need to rethink the authority wielded by psychiatrists 
the following section draws upon the literature on biological psychiatry and 
comparative practices to highlight the significant deficits bedeviling psychiatry in 
general.     
 
Psychiatry: Verifiable Biomarkers, Rare Findings 
 
Problems associated with psychiatric disorders, as indicated above, emerge 
from a paucity of identifiable „biomarkers‟ that would otherwise provide 
verification and diagnostic reliability for the many disorders described by 
psychiatry as defined within its five iterations of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual 
(DSM). A biological marker aka “biomarker”, refers to a medical sign, specifically, 
objective indication of medical states. Importantly, biomarkers are indicators used 
to achieve reliable prediction that can be „measured accurately and reproducibly‟ 
(Strimbu, & Tavel, 2010). Their utility serves clinicians and researchers in multiple 
ways from making and evaluating clinical decisions and subsequent treatment 
assessments in addition to furnishing measurement purposes, such as disease 
tracking and response, to serving diagnostic and prognostic determinations. 
Psychiatry, as a clinical practice, faces fundamental problems, two of which 
are: firstly, it cannot rely on identifiable biomarkers since they are largely 
nonexistent across many psychiatric disorders, and secondly, concern over 
diagnostic irregularities (Davies, 2013; Frances, 2013; Zachar, et.al, 2015). Two 
missing necessary conditions for expertise and medical authority, giving reason to 
question psychiatry as a domain of expert practice, let alone, mental health 
specialists. Rather perniciously, some might say, psychiatrists, by and large are not 
effectively taught how to taper medication. What should constitute medical 
professional education therefore is largely inadequate and given its history, this is a 
gross oversight in terms of formal clinical education psychiatrists receive. It also 
raises a whole series of ethical questions related to professional integrity, 
responsibility, duty of care to minimise harm under the principle of non-
maleficence and indeed accountability when harm, due to poor clinical 
management, is inflicted.  
    
Psychiatry: Requirements and Consequences 
 
Adding weight to this discussion is psychiatrist Bessel Van der Kolk whose 
life-long work, published under the title The Body Keeps the Score: Mind, Brain 
and Body in the Transformation of Trauma (2014) provides evidence grounded in 
empirical longitudinal studies. The work includes the presentation of studies 
conducted in several treatment centres across the globe drawn from a range of 
health and social disciplines. The increasing understanding of trauma, situates it, as 
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one of the most serious public health concerns and its manifestation and effect 
rather extensive. Kolk is critical of standard approaches to trauma and extended 
problems dealt with by practitioners, even those within his own field. Kolk argues 
that too many psychiatrists and other clinicians fail to recognise the symptoms of 
trauma, and as a consequence misdiagnose, then mismanage their patients, 
however inadvertently, in effect aiding the generation of comorbidities.  
Kolk‟s work was inspired by Stephen Porges‟ foundational development of 
the Polyvagal Theory that emerged from the “study of the evolution of the 
vertebrate autonomic nervous system (Porges, 2011, p. 263). One main insight 
drawn from the theory is that many of our social behaviours and vulnerabilities to 
emotional disorders are “hard wired” into our nervous system” (Porges, 2011, p. 
263). The theory provides ways of thinking about certain aspects of mental health, 
to develop „treatment techniques‟ that enable people greater means of 
communicating and „relating better to others‟. The referent for the term polyvagal 
is the vagus nerve („poly‟ means „many‟ and „vagal‟ points to the vagus nerve). 
The vagus nerve is an integral component of the Autonomic Nervous System 
(ANS). The vagus nerve extends from the brainstem to its interconnected branches 
to regulate several organs, not least the heart. According to the theory, there are 
two branches of the vagus that “are related to different behavioral strategies, one 
related to social interactions in safe environments and the other related to adaptive 
responses to life threat” (Porges, 2011, p. 263). 
The historical understanding of the ANS interprets two opposing components, 
one the sympathetic and the other parasympathetic. This understanding, dates back 
to the 1800‟s and took the form of an antagonism model. As Porges‟ explains, the 
model characterised the function of the ANS as a continuous battle between the 
two components. On one side, the sympathetic nervous system taken to be 
associated with fight-or-flight behavioural responses and the other side, the 
parasympathetic nervous system taken to be associated with „growth, health, and 
restoration‟. Since most of the organs of the body, for example, the heart, the 
lungs, and the gut, have “innervations from both sympathetic and parasympathetic 
components, the paired antagonism model evolved into “balance theories”” 
(Porges, 2011, p. 264). What Porges describes is very significant and testament to 
the paucity of understanding in which several medical schools of thought, 
including psychiatry, reliant upon an understanding of physiology fall behind, not 
keeping pace with new developments: 
 
Balance theories attempted to link tonic imbalances to both physical and mental 
health. For example, a sympathetic dominance might be related to symptoms of 
anxiety, hyperactivity, or impulsivity, while a parasympathetic dominance might be 
related to symptoms of depression or lethargy. In addition to the tonic features of 
autonomic state, the paired-antagonism model also assumed to explain the reactive 
features of the autonomic nervous system. This dependence on the construct of 
“autonomic balance” is still prevalent in textbooks, although there has been an 
intervening century in which neurophysiology has documented a second vagal 
pathway involved in regulating autonomic function. Unfortunately, this new 
knowledge of the second vagal pathway has not permeated the teaching of physiology, 
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which still is dominated by descriptions of the paired antagonism between the 
sympathetic and parasympathetic components of the autonomic nervous system 
(Porges, 2011, p. 264). 
 
This failure to keep pace with the emerging and new knowledge of physiology 
is what allows the myth of „chemical imbalance‟ to persist. The myth of chemical 
imbalance that forms part of the narrative emanating from the ranks of 
pharmaceutical industry-influenced research and their spokespersons, is what 
otherwise is meant to be the source underpinning mental health problems (Bentall, 
2010; Davies, 2013; Moncrieff, 2008; Pies, 2019; Whitaker, 2015). As psychiatrist 
Ronald, W. Pies (2019) laments: “The fact is, there could never have been a 
scientifically based, chemical imbalance theory of mental illness, because a 
genuine theory requires an integrated network of well-supported, interlinked 
hypotheses”. It is not that people do not experience some kinds of imbalance at 
times but not exploring the causes (nutrition, stress, chemical assaults on our 
brains, vitamin deficiencies, maturation, stress, trauma, etc.) and distorting the 
diagnosis such that consumers are led to believe that the only cure is through 
psychiatric drugs, is arguably unethical. Compliance towards professional practice 
requires duty of care and due diligence to keep abreast of up to date knowledge of 
one‟s clinical practice, particularly so on the part of the prescribing psychiatrist, 
when the drugs administered to patients can be, and are, very dangerous. The 
clinical literature on the dangers of psychiatric drugs is vast, and ignorance is no 
excuse. Accordingly, in practice, knowingly administering medication that 
produces debilitating adverse effects greater than the intended benefit for recipients 
from medications/drugs, is negligent and is a breach of the professional and ethical 
principle of Non-Maleficence or „Do No Harm‟ to say the least. Current 
psychiatric practice exposes a fundamental lack of analytical thinking and 
reflection in practice on the part of its practitioners and this suggests that the 
education psychiatrists receive is drastically deficient and in effect, and in no small 
way, compromises the safety and well-being of many patients/consumers. A 
revolution in psychiatric training is required and greater accountability assigned to 
its practitioners under the principle of justice, given the influence they exercise in 
the construction of Public Health Policies.  
In this essay I argued that the misplaced authority of psychiatry is harmful. 
The criteria required to justify and satisfy psychiatric expertise is not sufficiently 
established as substantiated by compelling reason to rethink its authority as a 
reliable profession. The identified criteria required to substantiate psychiatric 
expertise were found to be deficient. The main concerns dealt with related to 
diagnostic problems – reliability and verification of diagnoses and testable validity 
of diagnoses. In part due to the absence of underlying biomarkers ordinarily 
related to disease or biological conditions that psychiatry continues to face, 
verification, reliability and validity of diagnoses problems. In addition, a problem 
psychiatrist‟s face is distinguishing between reactive-depression and endogenous-
depression; with that the general problem of reliably distinguishing between 
conditions constitutive of „trait‟ and that of „state‟ (e.g. reactive depression; 
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adverse-effects from medication, etc.). Psychiatrists underplay the significance of 
the placebo effect which is linked to concerns regarding appropriate treatment and 
prescribed dosages. Considerable concern is directed at the persistent under-
reporting of adverse effects which is a disturbing omission of responsibility in 
psychiatric health care. Disconcertingly, practitioners instead regard and treat 
adverse effects as comorbidities, consequently, involving polypharmacy and thus 
amplifying dangerous adverse effects, in particular, suicidality.     
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